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In May 2008, Ofcom’s L-band auction concluded. This was Ofcom’s second combinatorial 
clock auction. The auction used an innovative format intended to encourage an efficient 
assignment of the 17 lots. Eight bidders competed for the lots. In sharp contrast to the first 
combinatorial clock auction, the 10-40 GHz auction, in which each of the ten bidders won 
spectrum, in the L-band auction there was a single winner—Qualcomm won all the lots. This 
note briefly reviews the auction. 
After examining the auction data, I find compelling evidence that the auction was fully 
efficient. The bidders had both an opportunity and an incentive to express their true preferences. 
The only potential source for inefficiency is the threshold problem. It is conceivable, in principle, 
that the seven losing bidders could have been hesitant to bid full values, because each anticipated 
that it would win its desired package at a lower price by bidding less. I think this possibility is 
extremely unlikely. The clock stage did not give the losing bidders any information to suggest 
either that they would win or that bidding less than full value would reduce the price paid. 
Rather, the information was decidedly negative in respect of both the scope for winning and 
scope for reducing prices, which gives the bidder the strongest incentive to bid full value to 
increase the probability of winning. Thus, I expect that the losing bids did reflect true 
preferences, in which case the outcome was fully efficient.  
The bids of several bidders were non-monotonic—a larger amount was bid for a package 
that was a strict subset of another package. In some cases this appeared to be the result of 
constraints from the activity rule, suggesting that some bidders failed to bid on the largest 
profitable package during the clock rounds. These binding activity rule constraints may have 
reduced auction revenues, but I doubt efficiency was compromised. 
I begin with a description of the L-band setting. Then I present the final outcome. I analyze 
the clock stage, and the bidding behavior of each bidder in both the clock stage and the 
supplementary round.  
1  Summary of environment and auction format 
The L-band is a band of radio spectrum which likely will be used for mobile multimedia 
broadcasting. The band consists of 16 nationwide 1.7 MHz lots (LA to LP), and one 12.5 MHz 
lot (LQ). Each lot differs in coverage as a result of border restrictions as well as other factors. 
Some technologies require the spectrum be organized in blocks of three contiguous lots. Other 
technologies require that all the lots be contiguous. And still others do not require contiguous 
lots. Finally, some technologies work better with a lower density of high power antennas, and 
others work better with a higher density of low power antennas. Low power and high power use 
are incompatible on adjacent lots and nearly adjacent lots, requiring two lots of separation as a 
guard-band. 
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  1Given these substantial differences across lots, the 17 lots were sold as specific lots, rather 
than grouped together and treated as nearly identical lots. Moreover, given the substantial 
differences in technologies with respect to power usage and the need for contiguous lots, a 
package auction was essential.  
The combinatorial clock auction enables the auction to determine the successful technology, 
rather than the regulator. Since at every point in the auction bidders are bidding on mutually 
exclusive packages of lots, there is no exposure problem. A bidder never runs the risk of winning 
just some of what it needs. Also, bids are binding commitments, and any of the bidder’s bids 
throughout the entire auction may be part of the winning set. This provides a strong incentive for 
a bidder to bid in a way that is consistent with its preferences. The combinatorial clock auction 
allows package bids without introducing the complexity that is often associated with 
combinatorial auctions. Rather the auction begins with a simple and familiar price discovery 
process, followed by a final round of bidding. Only at the end of the supplementary round does 
the auctioneer need to solve an optimization problem. The optimization takes just seconds for a 
problem the size of the L-band auction. 
The combinatorial clock auction has an activity rule to encourage price discovery. Without 
an activity rule, a bidder may wait until the supplementary round before submitting serious bids, 
and thereby undermine price discovery. The auction used the eligibility point rule—as prices 
increase the package size can stay the same or decrease; it cannot increase.  
Under the eligibility point rule, a bidder’s best strategy in the clock stage is not the natural 
one of bidding on its most profitable package given the round prices. Rather, the best strategy is 
to bid on its largest package that is still profitable. Only with this strategy can the bidder be sure 
that it will be able to bid its full value for desirable packages in the supplementary round. If the 
bidder instead bid on its most profitable package in each round of the clock stage, the bidder 
likely would face severe constraints in its supplementary bids for packages larger than its final 
clock package. Sometimes these constraints can result in nonmonotonic bids in which the bidder 
submits a higher bid for a package that is a strict subset of a larger package. 
2 Final  outcome 
The final outcome is shown in Table 1. Qualcomm won all 17 lots with a bid of 20,000 (all 
monetary amounts throughout are in thousands of pounds), just slightly above its final clock bid 
of 18,631. In the case of a single winner, it is a simple matter to determine the winner’s payment. 
It is just the value from the value-maximizing assignment without the winner. This is the 
opportunity cost of Qualcomm’s winning all the lots, and is shown in the second panel. The best 
assignment without Qualcomm awards the lots to ePortal, Vectone, and WorldSpace—the final 
three bidders to drop out in the clock stage. This yields a combined value of 8,334, which is 
QualComm’s price. 
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Qualcomm 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 H 20,000 8,334 8,334
Bidder Usage Bid
ePortal 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 L 3,382
Vectone 1 1 1 H 2,338
WorldSpace 1 H 2,614
ePortal 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 L 3,382
Vectone 1 1 1 H 2,338
WorldSpace 1 L 2,614
Without Qualcomm
 
This outcome is in sharp contrast to the first combinatorial clock auction, the 10-40 GHz 
auction, in which there were ten bidders and ten winners. The outcome here, with one winner, 
raises the possibility that perhaps the losing bidders faced a threshold problem, and failed to top 
the Qualcomm bid, not because of low values, but because of low bids. Under this hypothesis, 
the losing bidders failed to bid full values, because each expected to win with the lower bid and 
believed that a higher bid would result in a higher price and lower profits. I find this hypothesis 
implausible. The bidders information during the clock stage did not suggest winning was likely, 
nor did it suggest that a higher bid would translate into a higher payment and lower profits. 
Rather the information during the clock stage suggested that winning was unlikely. This gives 
the bidders strong incentives to increase their bids in order to improve the chance of winning. 
Even if there was some bid shading by the losing bidders, the bid shading would have to be 
implausibly large—bidding just 42% of value—for the Qualcomm win to be inefficient. 
3 Clock  stage 
I begin by looking at the bid data available to all bidders during the clock stage. The auction 
had 33 clock rounds. Table 2 shows a number of bidding statistics throughout the clock stage. 
The first is the total bidding activity, summing the package sizes across all bidders. The 
eligibility ratio (total eligibility over total supply) is a useful measure of the degree of 
competition. An initial eligibility ratio of 4.2 suggests a competitive auction—demand exceeds 
supply by a factor of 4.2. Auctions with initial eligibility ratios above 3 are typically viewed as 
highly competitive; initial eligibility ratios below 2 suggest weak competition. The next two 
columns show the average price per eligibility point and the standard deviation of price. Average 
prices increased steadily throughout the clock stage, although at a decreasing rate, as a smaller 
fraction of the lots increased in price with each round. It is interesting that the standard deviation 
of price was so small. On average across all rounds, the standard deviation was 10% of price. 
This is much less than the average bid increment of 17%. At least on the margin, the bidders 
viewed the lots as close substitutes and arbitraged across lots accordingly. Even at its highest 
(round 22), the standard deviation was only 20% of price. When the clock stage finished, the 
standard deviation was only 5% of price.  
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Eligibility Price Std dev Fraction Average
Rnd Activity ratio per point of price increase increase
1 70 4.2 50 100%
2 66 3.7 60 1 100% 19%
3 61 3.5 71 2 100% 19%
4 60 3.2 84 5 100% 18%
5 60 3.2 99 6 100% 18%
6 54 3.2 118 9 100% 19%
7 43 2.8 139 13 94% 18%
8 43 2.3 154 12 94% 11%
9 43 2.3 171 13 100% 11%
10 43 2.3 191 16 100% 12%
11 43 2.3 214 20 82% 12%
12 43 2.3 239 31 82% 12%
13 41 2.3 265 38 82% 11%
14 40 2.2 304 42 65% 15%
15 39 2.1 350 54 82% 15%
16 37 2.1 391 52 76% 12%
17 33 1.9 460 59 53% 18%
18 32 1.7 524 71 53% 14%
19 32 1.7 576 66 65% 10%
20 25 1.7 621 77 35% 8%
21 25 1.3 653 116 35% 5%
22 25 1.3 682 137 18% 4%
23 25 1.3 697 121 35% 2%
24 25 1.3 723 105 18% 4%
25 25 1.3 750 97 18% 4%
26 25 1.3 778 75 35% 4%
27 25 1.3 821 65 18% 6%
28 25 1.3 855 82 18% 4%
29 25 1.3 891 91 18% 4%
30 22 1.3 928 94 18% 4%
31 22 1.2 940 79 18% 1%
32 22 1.2 960 59 18% 2%
33 19 1.2 981 45 2%  
Table 3 shows the demands in each round for low and high power. Demands above 1 are 
shown with darker shades of orange. By round 20, all low power demand had vanished. The 
bidders at this point could be fairly confident that high power demands would win all lots, 
eliminating the need for guard bands. The auction ended with supply and demand balance across 
all lots.  
  4Table 3. Low and high power demand in the clock stage 
R n dL AL BL CL DL EL FL GL HL IL JL KL LL ML NL OL PL QL AL BL CL DL EL FL GL HL IL JL KL LL ML NL OL PL Q
1 13222222 2 2222221133321111 2 22222212
2 21122222 2 2222223111111111 2 22222213
3 12222222 2 2222211111111111 2 22222212
4 22222222 2 2222111111111111 1 22223321
5 22222222 2 2222111122211111 1 11122212
6 22211122 2 2222111111111111 1 11122212
7 11111111 1 1111 33211111 1 11111232
8 1111111 1 11111 21122211 1 11111123
9 11111111 1 1111 22111111 1 11112223
1 011111111 1 1111 22222111 1 11112222
1 111111111 1 1111 11222221 1 11111113
1 2 11111 1 1111111 11111222 2 21111113
1 3 11111 1 11111 11111111 1 11223332
1 4 11 1 1111111 11111111 1 11222223
1 511111111 1 1 22221111 1 11112222
1 611111111 1 11111111 1 11112223
1 71111111 11111111 1 11111123
1 8 1 111111 11111111 1 11112222
1 9 1 1 11111 22211122 2 11111111
2 0 11111112 2 21112221
2 1 11122211 1 11112221
2 2 33311111 1 11111111
2 3 22211111 1 12221111
2 4 11133311 1 11111111
2 5 11111111 1 13331111
2 6 22211111 1 12111221
2 7 11111333 1 11111111
2 8 11111111 1 33311111
2 9 11333111 1 11111111
3 0 11111111 2 11121121
3 1 22111111 1 11111211
3 2 11111111 2 21121111
3 3 11111111 1 11111111
Low power demand High power demand
 
Table 4. Total demand and prices in the clock stage 
R n dL AL BL CL DL EL FL GL HL IL JL KL LL ML NL OL PL Q L A L B L C L D L E L F L G L H L I L J L K L L L M L N L O L P L Q
1 46543333 4 44444423 5 0 5 0 5 0 5 0 5 0 5 0 5 05 0 5 0 5 0 5 0 5 0 5 0 5 0 5 05 0 1 5 0
2 32233333 4 44444444 6 0 6 0 6 0 6 0 6 0 6 0 6 06 0 6 0 6 0 6 0 6 0 6 0 6 0 6 05 5 1 8 0
3 23333333 4 44444323 7 2 6 6 6 6 7 2 7 2 7 2 7 27 2 7 2 7 2 7 2 7 2 7 2 7 2 7 26 6 2 1 6
4 33333333 3 44444432 7 9 7 6 7 6 8 6 8 6 8 6 8 68 6 8 6 8 6 8 6 8 6 8 6 8 6 8 67 3 2 5 9
5 44433333 3 33343323 9 1 9 1 9 11 0 3 1 0 3 1 0 3 1 0 3 1 0 3 1 0 3 1 0 3 1 0 31 0 3 1 0 3 1 0 3 1 0 38 4 2 8 5
6 33322233 3 33343323 1 0 9 1 0 9 1 0 91 2 4 1 2 4 1 2 4 1 2 4 1 2 4 1 2 4 1 2 4 1 2 41 2 4 1 2 4 1 2 4 1 2 49 2 3 2 8
7 44322222 2 22221232 1 3 1 1 3 1 1 3 11 3 6 1 3 6 1 3 6 1 4 9 1 4 9 1 4 9 1 4 9 1 4 91 4 9 1 4 9 1 4 9 1 4 9 1 0 1 3 9 4
8 22233322 2 22222123 1 5 7 1 5 7 1 5 71 5 0 1 5 0 1 5 0 1 6 4 1 6 4 1 6 4 1 6 4 1 6 41 6 4 1 6 4 1 4 9 1 6 4 1 1 6 4 3 3
9 33222222 2 22222223 1 7 3 1 7 3 1 7 31 7 3 1 7 3 1 7 3 1 8 0 1 8 0 1 8 0 1 8 0 1 8 01 8 0 1 8 0 1 5 6 1 6 4 1 2 8 4 9 8
1 033333222 2 22222222 1 9 9 1 9 9 1 9 01 9 0 1 9 0 1 9 0 1 9 8 1 9 8 1 9 8 1 9 8 1 9 81 9 8 1 9 8 1 7 2 1 7 2 1 4 1 5 9 8
1 122333332 2 22221113 2 3 9 2 3 9 2 1 82 1 8 2 1 8 2 0 9 2 1 8 2 1 8 2 1 8 2 1 8 2 1 82 1 8 2 1 8 1 8 9 1 8 9 1 5 5 6 5 8
1 211122333 3 32222223 2 6 3 2 6 3 2 6 22 6 2 2 6 2 2 4 0 2 5 1 2 4 0 2 4 0 2 4 0 2 4 02 4 0 2 4 0 1 8 9 1 8 9 1 5 5 7 5 7
1 311122222 2 22334332 2 6 3 2 6 3 2 6 22 8 8 2 8 8 2 8 8 3 0 1 2 7 6 2 7 6 2 7 6 2 6 42 6 4 2 6 4 1 9 8 1 9 8 1 6 3 9 0 8
1 411111122 2 22333333 2 6 3 2 6 3 2 6 23 3 1 3 3 1 3 3 1 3 4 6 3 1 7 3 1 7 3 1 7 3 0 43 2 3 3 2 3 2 5 7 2 4 3 2 0 0 1044
1 533332222 2 21112222 2 6 3 2 6 3 2 6 23 3 1 3 3 1 3 3 1 3 9 8 3 6 5 3 6 5 3 6 5 3 5 04 2 0 4 2 0 3 3 4 3 1 6 2 6 0 1279
1 622222222 2 11112223 3 0 2 3 0 2 3 0 13 8 1 3 5 6 3 5 6 4 5 8 4 2 0 4 2 0 4 2 0 3 5 04 2 0 4 2 0 3 8 4 3 6 3 2 9 9 1471
1 722222221 1 11111123 3 6 2 3 6 2 3 6 14 5 7 4 2 7 4 2 7 5 5 0 5 0 4 5 0 4 4 2 0 3 5 04 2 0 4 2 0 4 6 1 4 3 6 3 5 9 1912
1 811111111 2 22223322 4 3 4 4 3 4 4 3 35 4 8 5 1 2 5 1 2 6 6 0 5 0 4 5 0 4 4 2 0 3 5 04 2 0 4 2 0 4 6 1 4 3 6 4 3 1 2485
1 922211123 3 22222111 4 3 4 4 3 4 4 3 35 4 8 5 1 2 5 1 2 6 6 0 5 0 4 5 5 4 4 6 2 3 8 54 6 2 4 6 2 5 5 3 5 2 3 5 1 7 2982
2 011111112 2 21112221 4 7 7 4 7 7 4 7 65 4 8 5 1 2 5 1 2 7 2 6 6 0 5 6 6 5 5 5 4 4 6 25 5 4 5 5 4 6 6 4 5 2 3 5 1 7 2982
2 111122211 1 11112221 4 7 7 4 7 7 4 7 65 4 8 5 1 2 5 1 2 7 2 6 7 2 6 7 9 8 6 6 5 4 6 25 5 4 5 5 4 7 9 7 5 7 5 5 6 9 2982
2 233311111 1 11111111 4 7 7 4 7 7 4 7 66 0 3 5 6 3 5 6 3 7 2 6 7 2 6 7 9 8 6 6 5 4 6 25 5 4 5 5 4 9 5 6 6 9 0 6 8 3 2982
2 322211111 1 12221111 5 7 2 5 7 2 5 7 16 0 3 5 6 3 5 6 3 7 2 6 7 2 6 7 9 8 6 6 5 4 6 25 5 4 5 5 4 9 5 6 6 9 0 6 8 3 2982
2 411133311 1 11111111 6 8 6 6 8 6 6 8 56 0 3 5 6 3 5 6 3 7 2 6 7 2 6 7 9 8 6 6 5 5 0 86 0 9 6 0 9 9 5 6 6 9 0 6 8 3 2982
2 511111111 1 13331111 6 8 6 6 8 6 6 8 57 8 4 7 3 2 7 3 2 7 2 6 7 2 6 7 9 8 6 6 5 5 0 86 0 9 6 0 9 9 5 6 6 9 0 6 8 3 2982
2 622211111 1 12111221 6 8 6 6 8 6 6 8 57 8 4 7 3 2 7 3 2 7 2 6 7 2 6 7 9 8 6 6 5 6 6 07 9 2 7 9 2 9 5 6 6 9 0 6 8 3 2982
2 711111333 1 11111111 8 2 3 8 2 3 8 2 27 8 4 7 3 2 7 3 2 7 2 6 7 2 6 7 9 8 6 6 5 7 9 27 9 2 7 9 2 9 5 6 8 2 8 8 2 0 2982
2 811111111 1 33311111 8 2 3 8 2 3 8 2 27 8 4 7 3 2 9 5 2 9 4 4 9 4 4 7 9 8 6 6 5 7 9 27 9 2 7 9 2 9 5 6 8 2 8 8 2 0 2982
2 911333111 1 11111111 8 2 3 8 2 3 8 2 27 8 4 7 3 2 9 5 2 9 4 4 9 4 4 7 9 8 8 6 5 1030 1030 792 956 828 820 2982
3 011111111 2 11121121 8 2 3 8 2 3 1069 1019 952 952 944 944 798 865 1030 1030 792 956 828 820 2982
3 122111111 1 11111211 8 2 3 8 2 3 1069 1019 952 952 944 944 878 865 1030 1030 871 956 828 902 2982
3 211111111 2 21121111 9 4 6 9 4 6 1069 1019 952 952 944 944 878 865 1030 1030 871 956 952 902 2982
3 311111111 1 11111111 9 4 6 9 4 6 1069 1019 952 952 944 944 1010 995 1030 1030 1002 956 952 902 2982
Total demand Price (thousand GBP)
 
  5Table 4 shows the total demand and prices throughout the clock stage. Looking at the prices 
we see a strong tendency for bids to shift to less expensive lots. By the end of the auction, all the 
lots had converged to roughly the same price per eligibility point. From this it appears that many 
bidders view the lots as close substitutes. As a result, a variation of the auction format using 
generic lots as in the 2.6 GHz auction might have worked well. I believe that such a variation 
would have resulted in the same auction outcome in this case. 
The clock rounds appeared to be helpful for both price discovery and assignment discovery. 
The final clock assignment is identical to the final auction outcome. Moreover, the price paid 
was determined by the bids of the last three remaining bidders. Most of these bids were from the 
clock stage. 
Table 5. Bidding behavior in the clock stage, rounds 1-7 
Rnd, Bidder Eligibility Activity Bid Usage LA LB LC LD LE LF LG LH LI LJ LK LL LM LN LO LP LQ
1 7 9 7 0 5 05 0 5 0 5 05 05 05 05 0 5 05 0 5 0 5 0 5 05 05 05 01 5 0
Q u a l c o m m 1 9 1 9 9 5 0 H 1 11 11 1 1 1111 1 11 1 11
WorldSpace 3 3 150 H 1
V e c t o n e 1 9 1 9 9 5 0 L 1 11 11 1 1 1111 1 11 1 11
e P o r t a l 1 9 1 3 6 5 0 L 11 11 1 1 1111 1 11
Arqiva 10 7 350 H 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
JRC 2 2 100 L 1 1
Adolphus 4 4 200 H 1 1 1 1
MLL 3 3 150 H 1 1 1
2 7 0 6 6 6 06 0 6 0 6 06 06 06 06 0 6 06 0 6 0 6 0 6 06 06 05 51 8 0
Q u a l c o m m 1 9 1 9 1 , 1 3 5 H 1 11 11 1 1 1111 1 11 1 11
WorldSpace 3 3 180 H 1
V e c t o n e 1 9 1 9 1 , 1 3 5 L 1 11 11 1 1 1111 1 11 1 11
e P o r t a l 1 3 1 3 7 7 5 L 11 1 1 1111 1 11 1 1
Arqiva 7 7 420 H 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
JRC 2 2 115 L 1 1
Adolphus 4 3 180 H 1
MLL 3 H
3 6 6 6 1 7 26 6 6 6 7 27 27 27 27 2 7 27 2 7 2 7 2 7 27 27 26 62 1 6
Q u a l c o m m 1 9 1 9 1 , 3 5 0 H 1 11 11 1 1 1111 1 11 1 11
WorldSpace 3 3 216 H 1
V e c t o n e 1 9 1 9 1 , 3 5 0 L 1 11 11 1 1 1111 1 11 1 11
e P o r t a l 1 3 1 3 9 2 4 L 11 11 1 1 1111 1 11
Arqiva 7 7 504 H 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
JRC 2 L
Adolphus 3 H
4 6 1 6 0 7 97 6 7 6 8 68 68 68 68 6 8 68 6 8 6 8 6 8 68 68 67 32 5 9
Q u a l c o m m 1 9 1 9 1 , 5 9 5 H 1 11 11 1 1 1111 1 11 1 11
WorldSpace 3 3 245 H 111
V e c t o n e 1 9 1 9 1 , 5 9 5 L 1 11 11 1 1 1111 1 11 1 11
e P o r t a l 1 3 1 3 1 , 0 9 1 L 1 11 11 1 1 1111 1 1
Arqiva 7 6 516 H 1 1 1 1 1 1
5 60 60 91 91 91 103 103 103 103 103 103 103 103 103 103 103 103 84 285
Q u a l c o m m 1 9 1 9 1 , 8 7 8 H 1 11 11 1 1 1111 1 11 1 11
WorldSpace 3 3 285 H 1
V e c t o n e 1 9 1 9 1 , 8 7 8 L 1 11 11 1 1 1111 1 11 1 11
e P o r t a l 1 3 1 3 1 , 3 0 3 L 1 11 11 1 1 1111 1 1
Arqiva 6 6 582 H 1 1 1 1 1 1
6 60 54 109 109 109 124 124 124 124 124 124 124 124 124 124 124 124 92 328
Q u a l c o m m 1 9 1 9 2 , 2 3 5 H 1 11 11 1 1 1111 1 11 1 11
WorldSpace 3 3 328 H 1
V e c t o n e 1 9 1 6 1 , 8 6 3 L 1 11 1 1111 1 11 1 11
e P o r t a l 1 3 1 3 1 , 5 6 7 L 1 11 11 1 1 1111 1 1
Arqiva 6 3 372 H 1 1 1
7 54 43 131 131 131 136 136 136 149 149 149 149 149 149 149 149 149 101 394
Q u a l c o m m 1 9 1 9 2 , 6 3 7 H 1 11 11 1 1 1111 1 11 1 11
WorldSpace 3 3 363 H 1 1 1
Vectone 16 8 1,037 H 1 1 1 1 1 1
e P o r t a l 1 3 1 3 1 , 8 4 4 L 1 11 11 1 1 1111 1 1
Arqiva 3 H  
  6I now examine the actual bids by each bidder in the clock stage. This information was not 
available to the bidders during the clock stage. Tables 5-7 shows the bidding behavior for all 
bidders in each round of the clock stage. Activity reductions are shown in pink; the bidder’s 
name is highlighted in pink when the bidder drops out. The first row of each panel gives the 
round number, total eligibility, total activity, and current clock prices. Demand was robust across 
all lots in each of the early rounds. By round 3, three of the eight bidders had dropped out. By 
round 7, we were down to four bidders. 
Table 6. Bidding behavior in the clock stage, rounds 8-18 
Rnd Rnd, Bidder Eligibility Activity Bid Usage LA LB LC LD LE LF LG LH LI LJ LK LL LM LN LO LP LQ
8 43 43 157 157 157 150 150 150 164 164 164 164 164 164 164 149 164 116 433
8 Q u a l c o m m 1 9 1 9 2 , 9 3 1 H 1 11 11 1 1 1111 1 11 1 11
8 WorldSpace 3 3 433 H 1
8 Vectone 8 8 1,156 H 1 1 1 1 1 1
8 ePortal 13 13 2,061 L 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
9 43 43 173 173 173 173 173 173 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 156 164 128 498
9 Q u a l c o m m 1 9 1 9 3 , 2 4 4 H 1 11 11 1 1 1111 1 11 1 11
9 WorldSpace 3 3 498 H 1
9 Vectone 8 8 1,292 H 1 1 1 1 1 1
9 ePortal 13 13 2,298 L 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
10 43 43 199 199 190 190 190 190 198 198 198 198 198 198 198 172 172 141 598
10 Qualcomm 19 19 3,627 H 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
10 WorldSpace 3 3 598 H 1
10 Vectone 8 8 1,453 H 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
10 ePortal 13 13 2,544 L 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
11 43 43 239 239 218 218 218 209 218 218 218 218 218 218 218 189 189 155 658
11 Qualcomm 19 19 4,058 H 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
11 WorldSpace 3 3 658 H 1
11 Vectone 8 8 1,739 H 1 1 1 1 1 1
11 ePortal 13 13 2,867 L 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
12 43 43 263 263 262 262 262 240 251 240 240 240 240 240 240 189 189 155 757
12 Qualcomm 19 19 4,533 H 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
12 WorldSpace 3 3 757 H 1
12 Vectone 8 8 1,968 H 1 1 1 1 1 1
12 ePortal 13 13 2,988 L 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
13 43 41 263 263 262 288 288 288 301 276 276 276 264 264 264 198 198 163 908
13 Qualcomm 19 19 5,040 H 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
13 WorldSpace 3 3 559 H 111
13 Vectone 8 8 1,995 H 1 1 1 1 1 1
13 ePortal 13 11 2,983 L 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
14 41 40 263 263 262 331 331 331 346 317 317 317 304 323 323 257 243 200 1044
14 Qualcomm 19 19 5,772 H 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
14 WorldSpace 3 3 1,044 H 1
14 Vectone 8 8 2,390 H 1 1 1 1 1 1
14 ePortal 11 10 2,947 L 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
15 40 39 263 263 262 331 331 331 398 365 365 365 350 420 420 334 316 260 1279
15 Qualcomm 19 19 6,653 H 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
15 WorldSpace 3 3 910 H 111
15 Vectone 8 7 2,398 H 1 1 1 1 1
15 ePortal 10 10 3,274 L 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
16 39 37 302 302 301 381 356 356 458 420 420 420 350 420 420 384 363 299 1471
16 Qualcomm 19 19 7,423 H 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
16 WorldSpace 3 3 1,471 H 1
16 Vectone 7 6 2,517 H 111 1
1 6 e P o r t a l 1 0 9 3 , 2 9 6L 11 1 1 1111 1
17 37 33 362 362 361 457 427 427 550 504 504 420 350 420 420 461 436 359 1912
17 Qualcomm 19 19 8,732 H 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
17 WorldSpace 3 3 1,912 H 1
17 Vectone 6 4 2,271 H 11
17 ePortal 9 7 2,946 L 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
18 33 32 434 434 433 548 512 512 660 504 504 420 350 420 420 461 436 431 2485
18 Qualcomm 19 19 9,964 H 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
18 WorldSpace 3 3 1,328 H 111
18 Vectone 4 3 2,485 H 1
18 ePortal 7 7 3,011 L 1 1 1 1 1 1 1  
At round 13, ePortal begins making steady reductions. Vectone’s reductions begin in round 
15. 
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Rnd Rnd, Bidder Eligibility Activity Bid Usage LA LB LC LD LE LF LG LH LI LJ LK LL LM LN LO LP LQ
19 32 32 434 434 433 548 512 512 660 504 554 462 385 462 462 553 523 517 2982
19 Qualcomm 19 19 10,937 H 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
19 WorldSpace 3 3 1,301 H 1 1 1
19 Vectone 3 3 1,718 H 1 1 1
19 ePortal 7 7 3,382 L 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
20 32 25 477 477 476 548 512 512 726 605 665 554 462 554 554 664 523 517 2982
20 Qualcomm 19 19 11,808 H 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
20 WorldSpace 3 3 1,704 H 111
20 Vectone 3 3 1,824 H 1 1 1
20 ePortal 7 L
21 25 25 477 477 476 548 512 512 726 726 798 665 462 554 554 797 575 569 2982
21 Qualcomm 19 19 12,410 H 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
21 WorldSpace 3 3 1,941 H 111
21 Vectone 3 3 1,572 H 1 1 1
22 25 25 477 477 476 603 563 563 726 726 798 665 462 554 554 956 690 683 2982
22 Qualcomm 19 19 12,955 H 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
22 WorldSpace 3 3 1,430 H 1 1 1
22 Vectone 3 3 1,430 H 1 1 1
23 25 25 572 572 571 603 563 563 726 726 798 665 462 554 554 956 690 683 2982
23 Qualcomm 19 19 13,240 H 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
23 WorldSpace 3 3 1,570 H 1 1 1
23 Vectone 3 3 1,715 H 1 1 1
24 25 25 686 686 685 603 563 563 726 726 798 665 508 609 609 956 690 683 2982
24 Qualcomm 19 19 13,738 H 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
24 WorldSpace 3 3 1,729 H 1 1 1
24 Vectone 3 3 1,729 H 1 1 1
25 25 25 686 686 685 784 732 732 726 726 798 665 508 609 609 956 690 683 2982
25 Qualcomm 19 19 14,257 H 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
25 WorldSpace 3 3 1,726 H 1 1 1
25 Vectone 3 3 1,726 H 1 1 1
26 25 25 686 686 685 784 732 732 726 726 798 665 660 792 792 956 690 683 2982
26 Qualcomm 19 19 14,775 H 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
26 WorldSpace 3 3 2,033 H 1 1 1
26 Vectone 3 3 2,057 H 1 1 1
27 25 25 823 823 822 784 732 732 726 726 798 665 792 792 792 956 828 820 2982
27 Qualcomm 19 19 15,593 H 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
27 WorldSpace 3 3 2,184 H 1 1 1
27 Vectone 3 3 2,184 H 1 1 1
28 25 25 823 823 822 784 732 952 944 944 798 665 792 792 792 956 828 820 2982
28 Qualcomm 19 19 16,249 H 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
28 WorldSpace 3 3 2,249 H 1 1 1
28 Vectone 3 3 2,249 H 1 1 1
29 25 25 823 823 822 784 732 952 944 944 798 865 1030 1030 792 956 828 820 2982
29 Qualcomm 19 19 16,925 H 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
29 WorldSpace 3 3 2,338 H 1 1 1
29 Vectone 3 3 2,338 H 1 1 1
30 25 22 823 823 1069 1019 952 952 944 944 798 865 1030 1030 792 956 828 820 2982
30 Qualcomm 19 19 17,627 H 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
30 WorldSpace 3 3 2,410 H 1 1 1
30 Vectone 3 H
31 22 22 823 823 1069 1019 952 952 944 944 878 865 1030 1030 871 956 828 902 2982
31 Qualcomm 19 19 17,868 H 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
31 WorldSpace 3 3 2,474 H 1 1 1
32 22 22 946 946 1069 1019 952 952 944 944 878 865 1030 1030 871 956 952 902 2982
32 Qualcomm 19 19 18,238 H 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
32 WorldSpace 3 3 2,614 H 1 1 1
33 19 19 946 946 1069 1019 952 952 944 944 1010 995 1030 1030 1002 956 952 902 2982
33 Qualcomm 19 19 18,631 H 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1  
In round 20, ePortal drops out. There are no longer any bidders bidding for low power 
usage. In round 30, Vectone drops out. WorldSpace submits its final competing bid in round 32. 
The clock stage ends in round 33 with Qualcomm still bidding for all 17 lots. 
3.1  Bidding behavior including supplementary bids 
I now examine the bidding behavior of each of the eight bidders in the clock stage and the 
supplementary round. Supplementary bids are intended for bidders to increase their clock bids to 
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the clock rounds. Bidding behavior varied a great deal across bidders. As can be seen in Table 8, 
only two bidders submitted a significant number of supplementary bids. I suspect most bidders 
believed that the supplementary bids would not improve their chance of winning. 
Table 8. Number of package bids, considering only the highest bid on the package 
Primary Supplementary All
Bidder bids bids bids
Qualcomm 1 1
WorldSpace 12 2 14
Vectone 21 21
ePortal 1 15 16
Arqiva 4 4
JRC 1 1 2
Adolphus 2 2
MLL 14 14
Total 41 33 74  
Table 9 shows Qualcomm’s bids. Qualcomm’s bidding was straightforward. It bid for all 
lots in every clock round as well as in its single supplementary bid. The supplementary bid was 
the winning bid and so is highlighted in bright green. Based on the clock bidding of others, 
Qualcomm must have been quite confident that it would win all lots. It did raise in the 
supplementary round its final clock bid slightly from 18,631 to 20,000, but this raise was 
unnecessary for it to win all lots, given that it was the only active bidder in the final clock round 
and therefore the constraints on other bidders’ supplementary bids were clear.  
Qualcomm did not bid for smaller packages that might fit well with other bidders. 
Qualcomm likely had large complementarities from winning the entire L-band.  
Table 9. Qualcomm primary and supplementary bids 
Rnd Elig Act Bid Usage LA LB LC LD LE LF LG LH LI LJ LK LL LM LN LO LP LQ LA LB LC LD LE LF LG LH LI LJ LK LL LM LN LO LP LQ
11 91 9 9 5 0 H 11111111 1 11111111 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 150
21 91 91 , 1 3 5 H 11111111 1 11111111 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 55 180
31 91 91 , 3 5 0 H 11111111 1 11111111 72 66 66 72 72 72 72 72 72 72 72 72 72 72 72 66 216
41 91 91 , 5 9 5 H 11111111 1 11111111 79 76 76 86 86 86 86 86 86 86 86 86 86 86 86 73 259
51 91 91 , 8 7 8 H 11111111 1 11111111 91 91 91 103 103 103 103 103 103 103 103 103 103 103 103 84 285
61 91 92 , 2 3 5 H 11111111 1 11111111 109 109 109 124 124 124 124 124 124 124 124 124 124 124 124 92 328
71 91 92 , 6 3 7 H 11111111 1 11111111 131 131 131 136 136 136 149 149 149 149 149 149 149 149 149 101 394
81 91 92 , 9 3 1 H 11111111 1 11111111 157 157 157 150 150 150 164 164 164 164 164 164 164 149 164 116 433
91 91 93 , 2 4 4 H 11111111 1 11111111 173 173 173 173 173 173 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 156 164 128 498
10 19 19 3,627 H 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 199 199 190 190 190 190 198 198 198 198 198 198 198 172 172 141 598
11 19 19 4,058 H 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 239 239 218 218 218 209 218 218 218 218 218 218 218 189 189 155 658
12 19 19 4,533 H 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 263 263 262 262 262 240 251 240 240 240 240 240 240 189 189 155 757
13 19 19 5,040 H 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 263 263 262 288 288 288 301 276 276 276 264 264 264 198 198 163 908
14 19 19 5,772 H 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 263 263 262 331 331 331 346 317 317 317 304 323 323 257 243 200 1044
15 19 19 6,653 H 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 263 263 262 331 331 331 398 365 365 365 350 420 420 334 316 260 1279
16 19 19 7,423 H 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 302 302 301 381 356 356 458 420 420 420 350 420 420 384 363 299 1471
17 19 19 8,732 H 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 362 362 361 457 427 427 550 504 504 420 350 420 420 461 436 359 1912
18 19 19 9,964 H 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 434 434 433 548 512 512 660 504 504 420 350 420 420 461 436 431 2485
19 19 19 10,937 H 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 434 434 433 548 512 512 660 504 554 462 385 462 462 553 523 517 2982
20 19 19 11,808 H 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 477 477 476 548 512 512 726 605 665 554 462 554 554 664 523 517 2982
21 19 19 12,410 H 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 477 477 476 548 512 512 726 726 798 665 462 554 554 797 575 569 2982
22 19 19 12,955 H 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 477 477 476 603 563 563 726 726 798 665 462 554 554 956 690 683 2982
23 19 19 13,240 H 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 572 572 571 603 563 563 726 726 798 665 462 554 554 956 690 683 2982
24 19 19 13,738 H 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 686 686 685 603 563 563 726 726 798 665 508 609 609 956 690 683 2982
25 19 19 14,257 H 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 686 686 685 784 732 732 726 726 798 665 508 609 609 956 690 683 2982
26 19 19 14,775 H 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 686 686 685 784 732 732 726 726 798 665 660 792 792 956 690 683 2982
27 19 19 15,593 H 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 823 823 822 784 732 732 726 726 798 665 792 792 792 956 828 820 2982
28 19 19 16,249 H 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 823 823 822 784 732 952 944 944 798 665 792 792 792 956 828 820 2982
29 19 19 16,925 H 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 823 823 822 784 732 952 944 944 798 865 1030 1030 792 956 828 820 2982
30 19 19 17,627 H 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 823 823 1069 1019 952 952 944 944 798 865 1030 1030 792 956 828 820 2982
31 19 19 17,868 H 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 823 823 1069 1019 952 952 944 944 878 865 1030 1030 871 956 828 902 2982
32 19 19 18,238 H 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 946 946 1069 1019 952 952 944 944 878 865 1030 1030 871 956 952 902 2982
33 19 19 18,631 H 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 946 946 1069 1019 952 952 944 944 1010 995 1030 1030 1002 956 952 902 2982
SB 20,000 H 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Qualcomm
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Bidder Rnd Elig Act Bid Usage LA LB LC LD LE LF LG LH LI LJ LK LL LM LN LO LP LQ LA LB LC LD LE LF LG LH LI LJ LK LL LM LN LO LP LQ
WorldSpace 1 3 3 150 H 1 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 150
WorldSpace 2 3 3 180 H 1 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 55 180
WorldSpace 3 3 3 216 H 1 72 66 66 72 72 72 72 72 72 72 72 72 72 72 72 66 216
WorldSpace 4 3 3 245 H 1 1 1 79 76 76 86 86 86 86 86 86 86 86 86 86 86 86 73 259
WorldSpace 5 3 3 285 H 1 91 91 91 103 103 103 103 103 103 103 103 103 103 103 103 84 285
WorldSpace 6 3 3 328 H 1 109 109 109 124 124 124 124 124 124 124 124 124 124 124 124 92 328
WorldSpace 7 3 3 363 H 1 1 1 131 131 131 136 136 136 149 149 149 149 149 149 149 149 149 101 394
WorldSpace 8 3 3 433 H 1 157 157 157 150 150 150 164 164 164 164 164 164 164 149 164 116 433
WorldSpace 9 3 3 498 H 1 173 173 173 173 173 173 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 156 164 128 498
WorldSpace 10 3 3 598 H 1 199 199 190 190 190 190 198 198 198 198 198 198 198 172 172 141 598
WorldSpace 11 3 3 658 H 1 239 239 218 218 218 209 218 218 218 218 218 218 218 189 189 155 658
WorldSpace 12 3 3 757 H 1 263 263 262 262 262 240 251 240 240 240 240 240 240 189 189 155 757
WorldSpace 13 3 3 559 H 1 1 1 263 263 262 288 288 288 301 276 276 276 264 264 264 198 198 163 908
WorldSpace 14 3 3 1,044 H 1 263 263 262 331 331 331 346 317 317 317 304 323 323 257 243 200 1044
WorldSpace 15 3 3 910 H 1 1 1 263 263 262 331 331 331 398 365 365 365 350 420 420 334 316 260 1279
WorldSpace 16 3 3 1,471 H 1 302 302 301 381 356 356 458 420 420 420 350 420 420 384 363 299 1471
WorldSpace 17 3 3 1,912 H 1 362 362 361 457 427 427 550 504 504 420 350 420 420 461 436 359 1912
WorldSpace 18 3 3 1,328 H 1 1 1 434 434 433 548 512 512 660 504 504 420 350 420 420 461 436 431 2485
WorldSpace 19 3 3 1,301 H 1 1 1 434 434 433 548 512 512 660 504 554 462 385 462 462 553 523 517 2982
WorldSpace 20 3 3 1,704 H 1 1 1 477 477 476 548 512 512 726 605 665 554 462 554 554 664 523 517 2982
WorldSpace 21 3 3 1,941 H 1 1 1 477 477 476 548 512 512 726 726 798 665 462 554 554 797 575 569 2982
WorldSpace 22 3 3 1,430 H 1 1 1 477 477 476 603 563 563 726 726 798 665 462 554 554 956 690 683 2982
WorldSpace 23 3 3 1,570 H 1 1 1 572 572 571 603 563 563 726 726 798 665 462 554 554 956 690 683 2982
WorldSpace 24 3 3 1,729 H 1 1 1 686 686 685 603 563 563 726 726 798 665 508 609 609 956 690 683 2982
WorldSpace 25 3 3 1,726 H 1 1 1 686 686 685 784 732 732 726 726 798 665 508 609 609 956 690 683 2982
WorldSpace 26 3 3 2,033 H 1 1 1 686 686 685 784 732 732 726 726 798 665 660 792 792 956 690 683 2982
WorldSpace 27 3 3 2,184 H 1 1 1 823 823 822 784 732 732 726 726 798 665 792 792 792 956 828 820 2982
WorldSpace 28 3 3 2,249 H 1 1 1 823 823 822 784 732 952 944 944 798 665 792 792 792 956 828 820 2982
WorldSpace 29 3 3 2,338 H 1 1 1 823 823 822 784 732 952 944 944 798 865 1030 1030 792 956 828 820 2982
WorldSpace 30 3 3 2,410 H 1 1 1 823 823 1069 1019 952 952 944 944 798 865 1030 1030 792 956 828 820 2982
WorldSpace 31 3 3 2,474 H 1 1 1 823 823 1069 1019 952 952 944 944 878 865 1030 1030 871 956 828 902 2982
WorldSpace 32 3 3 2,614 H 1 1 1 946 946 1069 1019 952 952 944 944 878 865 1030 1030 871 956 952 902 2982
WorldSpace SB 2,614 H 1
WorldSpace SB 2,614 L 1
WorldSpace
 
Table 10 shows WorldSpace bids. WorldSpace started out with little eligibility of 3 points, 
and remained at that level until the last round of the clock stage. WorldSpace arbitraged between 
lot LQ and three smaller lots. Interestingly, WorldSpace did not always bid on contiguous lots. It 
often bid on the three least expensive lots, or on the LQ lot if that was less expensive. This 
behavior was one of the main reasons why the prices across all lots equalized on a per point 
basis. 
WorldSpace submitted only two supplementary bids. Both were for LQ at the same price, 
one high power and one low power. These bids, highlighted in yellow, were important in that 
they were among the bids that determined Qualcomm’s payment. It is difficult to understand 
why WorldSpace did not enter a more complete set of supplementary bids. Based on its bidding 
in the clock stage, it would appear to value nearly any set of three small lots at its upper limit of 
2,614. Perhaps it thought that the extra bids would have little chance of success. 
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Bidder Rnd Elig Act Bid Usage LA LB LC LD LE LF LG LH LI LJ LK LL LM LN LO LP LQ LA LB LC LD LE LF LG LH LI LJ LK LL LM LN LO LP LQ
V e c t o n e 1 1 91 9 9 5 0 L 11111111 1 11111111 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 150
V e c t o n e 2 1 91 91 , 1 3 5 L 11111111 1 11111111 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 55 180
V e c t o n e 3 1 91 91 , 3 5 0 L 11111111 1 11111111 72 66 66 72 72 72 72 72 72 72 72 72 72 72 72 66 216
V e c t o n e 4 1 91 91 , 5 9 5 L 11111111 1 11111111 79 76 76 86 86 86 86 86 86 86 86 86 86 86 86 73 259
V e c t o n e 5 1 91 91 , 8 7 8 L 11111111 1 11111111 91 91 91 103 103 103 103 103 103 103 103 103 103 103 103 84 285
Vectone 6 19 16 1,863 L 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 109 109 109 124 124 124 124 124 124 124 124 124 124 124 124 92 328
Vectone 7 16 8 1,037 H 1 1 1 1 1 1 131 131 131 136 136 136 149 149 149 149 149 149 149 149 149 101 394
Vectone 8 8 8 1,156 H 1 1 1 1 1 1 157 157 157 150 150 150 164 164 164 164 164 164 164 149 164 116 433
Vectone 9 8 8 1,292 H 1 1 1 1 1 1 173 173 173 173 173 173 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 156 164 128 498
V e c t o n e 1 0 8 8 1 , 4 5 3 H 11111 111 199 199 190 190 190 190 198 198 198 198 198 198 198 172 172 141 598
V e c t o n e 1 1 8 8 1 , 7 3 9 H 11111 1 239 239 218 218 218 209 218 218 218 218 218 218 218 189 189 155 658
Vectone 12 8 8 1,968 H 1 1 1 1 1 1 263 263 262 262 262 240 251 240 240 240 240 240 240 189 189 155 757
Vectone 13 8 8 1,995 H 1 1 1 1 1 1 263 263 262 288 288 288 301 276 276 276 264 264 264 198 198 163 908
Vectone 14 8 8 2,390 H 1 1 1 1 1 1 263 263 262 331 331 331 346 317 317 317 304 323 323 257 243 200 1044
V e c t o n e 1 5 8 7 2 , 3 9 8 H 1111 1 263 263 262 331 331 331 398 365 365 365 350 420 420 334 316 260 1279
Vectone 16 7 6 2,517 H 1 1 1 1 302 302 301 381 356 356 458 420 420 420 350 420 420 384 363 299 1471
Vectone 17 6 4 2,271 H 1 1 362 362 361 457 427 427 550 504 504 420 350 420 420 461 436 359 1912
Vectone 18 4 3 2,485 H 1 434 434 433 548 512 512 660 504 504 420 350 420 420 461 436 431 2485
Vectone 19 3 3 1,718 H 1 1 1 434 434 433 548 512 512 660 504 554 462 385 462 462 553 523 517 2982
Vectone 20 3 3 1,824 H 1 1 1 477 477 476 548 512 512 726 605 665 554 462 554 554 664 523 517 2982
Vectone 21 3 3 1,572 H 1 1 1 477 477 476 548 512 512 726 726 798 665 462 554 554 797 575 569 2982
V e c t o n e 2 2 3 3 1 , 4 3 0 H 111 477 477 476 603 563 563 726 726 798 665 462 554 554 956 690 683 2982
V e c t o n e 2 3 3 3 1 , 7 1 5 H 111 572 572 571 603 563 563 726 726 798 665 462 554 554 956 690 683 2982
Vectone 24 3 3 1,729 H 1 1 1 686 686 685 603 563 563 726 726 798 665 508 609 609 956 690 683 2982
Vectone 25 3 3 1,726 H 1 1 1 686 686 685 784 732 732 726 726 798 665 508 609 609 956 690 683 2982
V e c t o n e 2 6 3 3 2 , 0 5 7 H 111 686 686 685 784 732 732 726 726 798 665 660 792 792 956 690 683 2982
Vectone 27 3 3 2,184 H 1 1 1 823 823 822 784 732 732 726 726 798 665 792 792 792 956 828 820 2982
Vectone 28 3 3 2,249 H 1 1 1 823 823 822 784 732 952 944 944 798 665 792 792 792 956 828 820 2982
V e c t o n e 2 9 3 3 2 , 3 3 8 H 111 823 823 822 784 732 952 944 944 798 865 1030 1030 792 956 828 820 2982
Vectone 30 3 H 823 823 1069 1019 952 952 944 944 798 865 1030 1030 792 956 828 820 2982
Vectone
 
Table 11 shows the bids of Vectone. Vectone started bidding for all lots with low power 
usage. In round 7, Vectone sharply reduced demand and switched to high power usage. Vectone 
appears to have a minimum scale of three contiguous lots, and is willing to arbitrage across lots 
based on price. It appears that Vectone did not bid on the largest profitable package given the 
round prices. This would explain why Vectone’s bids are nonmonotonic. Vectone bid more on 
smaller packages that are a strict subset of larger packages on which it also bid. Vectone chose 
not to submit any supplementary bids. If it did, its bids on larger packages would be sharply 
constrained and would violate monotonicity. Vectone’s final bid highlighted in Yellow was part 
of the bid set that determined Qualcomm’s payment.  
Table 12. ePortal primary and supplementary bids 
Bidder Rnd Elig Act Bid Usage LA LB LC LD LE LF LG LH LI LJ LK LL LM LN LO LP LQ LA LB LC LD LE LF LG LH LI LJ LK LL LM LN LO LP LQ
e P o r t a l 1 1 91 3 6 5 0 L 1111111 1 11111 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 150
ePortal 2 13 13 775 L 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 55 180
e P o r t a l 3 1 31 3 9 2 4 L 1111111 1 11111 72 66 66 72 72 72 72 72 72 72 72 72 72 72 72 66 216
e P o r t a l 4 1 31 31 , 0 9 1 L 11111111 1 1111 79 76 76 86 86 86 86 86 86 86 86 86 86 86 86 73 259
e P o r t a l 5 1 31 31 , 3 0 3 L 11111111 1 1111 91 91 91 103 103 103 103 103 103 103 103 103 103 103 103 84 285
e P o r t a l 6 1 31 31 , 5 6 7 L 11111111 1 1111 109 109 109 124 124 124 124 124 124 124 124 124 124 124 124 92 328
e P o r t a l 7 1 31 31 , 8 4 4 L 11111111 1 1111 131 131 131 136 136 136 149 149 149 149 149 149 149 149 149 101 394
e P o r t a l 8 1 31 32 , 0 6 1 L 1111111 1 11111 157 157 157 150 150 150 164 164 164 164 164 164 164 149 164 116 433
e P o r t a l 9 1 31 32 , 2 9 8 L 11111111 1 1111 173 173 173 173 173 173 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 156 164 128 498
e P o r t a l 1 01 31 32 , 5 4 4 L 11111111 1 1111 199 199 190 190 190 190 198 198 198 198 198 198 198 172 172 141 598
e P o r t a l 1 11 31 32 , 8 6 7 L 11111111 1 1111 239 239 218 218 218 209 218 218 218 218 218 218 218 189 189 155 658
ePortal 12 13 13 2,988 L 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 263 263 262 262 262 240 251 240 240 240 240 240 240 189 189 155 757
ePortal 13 13 11 2,983 L 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 263 263 262 288 288 288 301 276 276 276 264 264 264 198 198 163 908
ePortal 14 11 10 2,947 L 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 263 263 262 331 331 331 346 317 317 317 304 323 323 257 243 200 1044
e P o r t a l 1 51 01 03 , 2 7 4 L 11111111 1 1 263 263 262 331 331 331 398 365 365 365 350 420 420 334 316 260 1279
e P o r t a l 1 61 09 3 , 2 9 6 L 11111111 1 302 302 301 381 356 356 458 420 420 420 350 420 420 384 363 299 1471
e P o r t a l 1 7 9 7 2 , 9 4 6 L 1111111 362 362 361 457 427 427 550 504 504 420 350 420 420 461 436 359 1912
ePortal 18 7 7 3,011 L 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 434 434 433 548 512 512 660 504 504 420 350 420 420 461 436 431 2485
ePortal 19 7 7 3,382 L 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 434 434 433 548 512 512 660 504 554 462 385 462 462 553 523 517 2982
ePortal 20 7 L 477 477 476 548 512 512 726 605 665 554 462 554 554 664 523 517 2982
e P o r t a l S B 3 , 1 0 0 L 1111111 1 11111
ePortal SB 3,000 L 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
e P o r t a l S B 2 , 9 0 0 L 11111111 1 1111
ePortal SB 3,000 L 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ePortal SB 3,000 L 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
e P o r t a l S B 3 , 2 7 8 L 11111111 1 1
e P o r t a l S B 3 , 2 9 8 L 11111111 1
e P o r t a l S B 3 , 0 0 0 L 1111111
ePortal SB 3,012 L 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
e P o r t a l S B 3 , 0 0 0 L 1111111
ePortal SB 3,000 L 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ePortal SB 3,000 L 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ePortal SB 3,000 L 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ePortal SB 3,000 L 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ePortal SB 3,000 L 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ePortal
 
  11Table 12 shows ePortal’s bids. ePortal required contiguous spectrum and appears to have a 
minimum scale of 7 lots. ePortal did submit many supplementary bids, many of which violate 
monotonicity. However, it was not the case that the activity rule caused ePortal’s bids to violate 
monotonicity. ePortal’s final clock bid proved to be part of the bid set that determined 
Qualcomm’s payment. All of ePortal’s bids are less than about 3,000. 
Table 13. Primary and supplementary bids of Aqiva, JRC, Adolphus, and MLL 
Bidder Rnd Elig Act Bid Usage LA LB LC LD LE LF LG LH LI LJ LK LL LM LN LO LP LQ LA LB LC LD LE LF LG LH LI LJ LK LL LM LN LO LP LQ
Arqiva 1 10 7 350 H 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 150
Arqiva 2 7 7 420 H 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 55 180
Arqiva 3 7 7 504 H 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 72 66 66 72 72 72 72 72 72 72 72 72 72 72 72 66 216
Arqiva 4 7 6 516 H 1 1 1 1 1 1 79 76 76 86 86 86 86 86 86 86 86 86 86 86 86 73 259
A r q i v a 5 6 6 5 8 2 H 111 111 91 91 91 103 103 103 103 103 103 103 103 103 103 103 103 84 285
Arqiva 6 6 3 372 H 1 1 1 109 109 109 124 124 124 124 124 124 124 124 124 124 124 124 92 328
Arqiva 7 3 H 131 131 131 136 136 136 149 149 149 149 149 149 149 149 149 101 394
JRC 1 2 2 100 L 1 1 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 150
JRC 2 2 2 115 L 1 1 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 55 180
JRC 3 2 L 72 66 66 72 72 72 72 72 72 72 72 72 72 72 72 66 216
JRC SB 120 L 1 1
A d o l p h u s 1 4 4 2 0 0 H 1111 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 150
Adolphus 2 4 3 180 H 1 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 55 180
Adolphus 3 3 H 72 66 66 72 72 72 72 72 72 72 72 72 72 72 72 66 216
M L L 1 3 3 1 5 0 H 111 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 150
MLL 2 3 H 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 55 180
M L L S B 1 6 5 H 111
M L L S B 1 6 5 H 111
M L L S B 1 6 5 H 111
MLL SB 165 H 1 1 1
MLL SB 165 H 1 1 1
MLL SB 165 H 1 1 1
MLL SB 165 H 1 1 1
MLL SB 165 H 1 1 1
MLL SB 165 H 1 1 1
MLL SB 165 H 1 1 1
MLL SB 165 H 1 1 1
MLL SB 165 H 1 1 1
MLL SB 165 H 1 1 1






The bids of the four weakest bidders are shown in Table 13. All four bidders dropped out 
early in the auction, and had little chance of winning. Nonetheless, MLL submitted a full 
contingent of bids for three contiguous small lots, apparently hoping that one of the bids would 
fit well with other bidders. One of Arqiva’s bids violates monotonicity. 
3.2 Optimization 
Two independent optimizers were used to find the optimal assignment and prices. Both 
optimizers found the same unique solution. The assignment and prices with 8 bidders and 74 bids 
were determined in a combined time of 0.14 seconds. 
4 Conclusion 
The L-band auction successfully demonstrated the desirable features of the combinatorial 
clock auction. The bidders had strong incentives to submit truthful bids during the clock stage 
and in the supplementary round. Assuming they did, then the outcome was fully efficient. 
The auction was competitive with an initial eligibility ratio of 4.2. However, one bidder 
Qualcomm was much stronger than the others and appeared to have strong complementarities for 
all lots. As a result, Qualcomm won all the lots. 
My only concern is with the activity rule. Several of the bidders failed to bid on the largest 
profitable package in the clock stage, consistent with the incentives of the eligibility point rule. 
As a result, the bids of these bidders violated monotonicity—they sometimes bid more for a 
smaller package that was a strict subset of a larger package. The activity rule somtimes prevented 
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bidding strategy they employed in the primary rounds, which appears to have deviated from the 
optimal strategy of bidding on the largest profitable package at the round prices.  
Most bidders failed to submit a complete set of supplementary bids. The absence of these 
bids may have reduced auction revenues somewhat. Still I doubt that including these bids would 
have altered the final assignment. Qualcomm would still win all lots, but perhaps pay a bit more. 
Finally, there may be some concern that Qualcomm winning all lots was somehow caused 
by the threshold problem sometimes seen in package auctions. I doubt this was the case. The 
losing bidders did not have an incentive to substantially shade their bids. Qualcomm almost 
surely won all lots because it valued the lots more than the other bidders. I am confident that the 
auction outcome was efficient. 
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